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Until fairly recently, a brief review of the free will literature would
have strongly suggested that compatibilists were winning the argu-
ment. At least, so it would have seemed were a poll the way to
determine such things: there were simply more philosophers pur-
porting to believe that freedom, when rightly analyzed, is compatible
with determinism than philosophers purporting to deny it. In part,
this was due to the desire of many philosophers to offer analyses of
ordinary concepts under which the ordinary and the manifest can
persist side-by-side with the facts as reported by the natural sciences.
There is no particular reason, however, to think that the naturalistic
commitments of those wanting to preserve our ordinary judgments
about the freedom of ourselves and others require compatibilism, for
there is no particular reason to think that determinism is true, that
the sciences tell us it is, or that belief in it is a necessary condition of
scientiﬁc inquiry. Since for all that science tells us determinism very
well might be false, preserving our freedom does not require a
compatibilist theory of it. Thus, in recent years, incompatibilism has
shown a resurgence, and among the resurgent are philosophers
wedded to some form of naturalism. Randolph Clarkes Libertarian
Accounts of Free Will oﬀers a careful, often insightful examination of
the prospects for an adequate naturalist libertarian incompatibilism;
the book examines, that is, theories of freedom under which free
action is possible should determinism be false and should the world
be as the natural sciences tell us it is. It is an excellent book that
anyone interested in this topic should read.
Clarke divides incompatibilist libertarian views into three sorts:
non-causal, event-causal and agent-causal accounts. According to
noncausal accounts, it is possible for an act to be free despite the fact
that neither the action nor any event closely related to it is caused.
This is not to say that noncausal accounts positively insist that free
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actions are, or involve, uncaused events; some views of this sort do
insist on this, but others simply do not appeal to causation in their
analyses of the full range of free actions, thus leaving open the
possibility that at least some free actions involve only uncaused
events. Carl Ginets position, according to which every free action
either is or involves a basic free action marked by its ‘‘actish
phenomenal quality,’’ is taken by Clarke as a paradigm example of a
noncausal view.1 After all, for Ginet, should a basic act have this
‘‘actish phenomenal quality’’ and be uncaused it would still be a free
action; neither its causes nor its internal causal structure (were it to
have any) are relevant to the question of whether or not such an act is
free.
Clarke spends just one short chapter examining noncausal
accounts. By way of comparison, he spends ﬁve chapters in
discussion of event-causal accounts and three of agent-causal. Clarke
appears to take non-causal accounts to go much less far in accounting
for the fundamental and deﬁning features of free action than views of
the other two sorts. The primary problem he identiﬁes for such views,
however, seems to me to be somewhat less decisive than Clarke makes
it out to be.2 The problem, as he sees it, is that noncausal views
cannot account for the sense in which free actions involve active
control on the part of the agent whose acts they are. In support of this
contention, he writes, of Ginets position,
[A]n event with the actish phenomenal quality could be brought about by external
brain stimulation, in the absence of any relevant desire or intention on the part of
the ‘‘agent’’. Given that what is at issue is an intrinsic phenomenal quality, there
would appear to be no grounds for disallowing such a thing. But an event
produced in this way and in these circumstances hardly seems to be an exercise of
agency at all.3
It is important to distinguish the objection Clarke is making to
Ginets view from the objection he is making to any noncausal
position. One might criticize a noncausal position on the grounds that
it misidentiﬁes that feature of some acts by virtue of which they are
acts without suggesting that the problem derives from a failure to put
causal conditions into the account. One might think, for instance,
that a mere feeling attending certain events cannot account for their,
1 Carl Ginet, On Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
2 Clarke identiﬁes a second problem, as well. He thinks that many free actions
are done for reasons, a notion that he thinks must be analyzed causally.
3 Randolph Clarke, Libertarian Accounts of FreeWill (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2003), p. 20.
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or other events status as action, even if the feelings in question were
to play some kind of causal role in bringing about the relevant events.
That would not amount to an objection to noncausalism per se; even
if successful, such an objection would leave room for the possibility of
a better noncausal view, a view that appeals to something other than
a mere feeling. Clarke takes himself, however, to be objecting to any
noncausal position, and so he seems to be saying that noncausalism
cannot provide for active control because there is always the
possibility that the agent is passive with respect to that from which
activity putatively springs.
Notice that the form of argument here is of the sort sometimes
levied against those who take actions, events with respect to which
the agent exercises some degree of active control, to be events in
themselves passive that are caused by other events in themselves
passive. On such views, actions are actions not because the agent is
active with respect to their causes, but because the agent bears some
other relation to their causes; activity, on such views, emerges from
the relations among intrinsically passive events and the agent. On a
view, for instance, according to which a bodily movement caused
(non-deviantly) by belief-desire complexes is action, the agent need
not be active with respect to the belief-desire complex; rather, belief-
desire complexes are thought, by advocates of such positions, to bear
some other important relation to the agent – a tie, for instance, to his
rational capacities, or some distinctive form of ‘‘internality’’ – that
accounts for the agents activity with respect to their eﬀects. It is
naturally objected that under such views the causes of the action-
constituting antecedents of action could include the likes of ‘‘external
brain stimulation,’’ or some other force with respect to which the
agent is passive, without thereby rendering the agent passive with
respect to their eﬀects. On such views, that is, the causes of the
relevant belief-desire complexes are not relevant to the question of
whether or not the agent is active with respect to their eﬀects. But this
is not much of an objection to such positions, for it simply amounts
to asserting as an objection precisely what the advocate of the view
already accepts. A stronger form of objection presses on the passive
states causation by which constitutes action, on such views; why is it
that the relation, whatever it is, that such states bear to the agent
makes it the case that the relevant eﬀects are actions? How can
activity arise from passivity? Similarly, there is a legitimate question
to be raised against Ginet, for instance, as to why the ‘‘actish
phenomenal quality’’ of an event should account for the events status
BOOK REVIEW 487
as action. As Clarke points out, it is far from clear how a mere feeling
could do this kind of work. But the obstacle to its doing so cannot be
merely that events of that sort could be brought about through
processes over which the agent exercises no active control, as Clarke
suggests. Arguably, it is a virtue of Ginets position that this is so: it
means that the position allows for the possibility that activity can
emerge from combinations of events which, when taken individually,
are nothing but mere happenings.
There is a further, important point to be made here: Clarke
presses the point that libertarian incompatibilists can and should
accept causal theories of action – theories that take an events
status as action to derive from the fact that it is caused by certain
special events, bearing a special relation to the agent. In fact, this
is a particularly interesting and important aspect of Clarkes
thought on these matters, since it suggests that incompatibilists can
make what looks (but only looks) like a large concession to
compatibilists without, Clarke argues, giving up their fundamental
disagreement with them. Even if actions are nothing but events
which, when considered individually, no one is active with respect
to, still there might be a need for the falsity of determinism if
those acts are to be free. But given this aspect of Clarkes position,
he, in particular, should not object to noncausal accounts on the
grounds that he does. One cannot accept the kind of theory of
action that Clarke endorses without rejecting objections of the
form that he levies against Ginet and other advocates of noncausal
views.
The point just made should, perhaps, be put a bit more modestly:
Clarke asserts that active control of action is, necessarily, a causal
phenomenon; to have active control of an event is to have some kind
of causal control of it. This may very well be true, but it is a difﬁcult
point to argue for and it cannot be supported merely by suggesting
that, on views that deny it, the agent can be thought to be active with
respect to one event despite being passive with respect to that which,
supposedly, accounts for his being active. As I have suggested, that,
after all, is a commitment of many causal theories of action of the
sort that Clarke endorses.
Clarke spends much more space in consideration of event-causal
accounts. In fact, he gives such views a more thorough and careful
treatment than anyone else has to date. According to such positions,
free actions are indeterministically caused by what Clarke aptly calls
‘‘agent-involving events.’’ The idea is that theories of this sort appeal
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to exactly the same sorts of mental states and events as antecedents of
free action as do compatibilists. Such views differ from those of
compatibilists only in requiring that the causal relation between those
agent-involving events and free action is, necessarily, indeterministic.
An event-causal account that asserts only this much Clarke refers to
as an ‘‘unadorned’’ account. Various incompatibilists, such as Robert
Kane,4 advocate event causal positions and add further conditions to
their accounts of free action. Clarke argues convincingly that, ﬁrst, an
agent whose action satisﬁes the conditions for freedom speciﬁed by
an unadorned view possesses many of those valuable things that we
take a free agent to possess and, second, adorning the view adds
nothing further of value. The simple theory is just as good as the
more complex.
Clarke takes unadorned event-causal views to provide everything
that the most sophisticated forms of compatibilism provide, and
more. So, for instance, if a compatibilist is right to think that
something of value is secured when the effectiveness of an agents ﬁrst
order motivations depends on her endorsement of their effectiveness,5
then the event-causal incompatibilist can secure that very same
valuable thing and in the same way, for the compatibilist does not
require, but merely permits, that the causal relation between higher
order attitudes and eﬀective ﬁrst order motivation be deterministic.
The event-causal libertarian can get all that the compatibilist gets plus
whatever theoretical beneﬁts, if there are any, can be gained through
insisting that the relevant causal relations be indeterministic. And,
further, Clarke argues that there are many beneﬁts to be gained
through the addition of indeterministic causation. For instance, by
appeal to indeterministic causal relations, it is possible to account for
the sense in which the future is open to us as it appears to be when we
deliberate, something which he takes compatibilists to be incapable of
explaining. When an event is indeterministically caused, there would
have been no violation in the laws of nature had a diﬀerent,
incompatible event taken place, even given exactly the same past; the
road, we might say, really does branch, just as it appears to us to do
when we deliberate.
4 Robert Kane, The Signiﬁcance of Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1996).
5 As on the view advocated in Harry Frankfurt, ‘‘Freedom of the Will and the
Concept of a Person,’’ The Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971), pp. 5–20.
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Although Clarke has made the point in earlier work,6 in the book
he decisively demonstrates that event-causal incompatibilists can reap
the beneﬁts of compatibilists views without incurring the compatib-
ilists determinist liability. In order to show this, Clarke needs to
show, among other things, that there is no form of explanation of
action that can be provided by a deterministic cause but not by an
indeterministic. It has sometimes been suggested, for instance, that
indeterministically caused events cannot be given contrastive expla-
nations – explanations that say not just why the event occurred, but
also why it occurred rather than some other event that also would
have been consistent with the laws of nature and the past. Clarke
argues that, in fact, even indeterministically caused events can
sometimes be contrastively explained and there is little of value lost in
the absence of contrastive explanations of others. The case, then, that
Clarke makes for thinking that event-causal libertarianism ought to
build on, rather than reject, the insights of compatibilism marks a
very important contribution to the literature and should have a great
inﬂuence on further developments of event-causal views.
In insisting that event-causalism secures all that the best compa-
tibilisms secure and more, Clarke ﬁnds himself defending the
following position: If determinism is compatible with moral respon-
sibility, although incompatible with free will (as many now believe7),
then an unadorned event-causal libertarianism provides a fully
adequate account of the nature of free action. However, if determin-
ism is incompatible with moral responsibility as well as free will
(perhaps because no one can be genuinely deserving of blame if
determinism is true) then event-causal libertarianism is no better than
compatibilism, which is inadequate by deﬁnition under such a
condition. The idea here is simpler than this summary makes it
sound: The good things that are secured by event-causal views that
are not secured by compatibilism (i.e., genuine openness of alterna-
tives) get event-causal views closer to explaining the basis of free will.
But the good things that are secured by event-causal views
that are relevant to explaining the basis of moral responsibility
are also secured by compatibilism. Hence, event-causalists are
committed to insisting on the compatibility of moral responsibility
and determinism.
6 Randolph Clarke, ‘‘Toward a Credible Agent-Causal Account of Free Will,’’
Nous 27 (1993), pp. 191–203.
7 This ‘‘semi-compatibilist’’ position is defended, most notably, in John Fischer,
The Metaphysics of Free Will (London: Blackwell Publishers, 1994).
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Clarkes commitment to this position derives, in part, from an
assumption: he is assuming that all that is required for genuine desert
of blame and praise is a certain sort of active control of the action for
which one is blamed or praised. Given this assumption, it is no
surprise that event-causal incompatibilists can do no better (and, it is
worth emphasizing, no worse) than compatibilists in identifying the
necessary conditions of desert of blame and praise, for event-
causalists do not add to compatibilist accounts of active control but,
instead, simply co-opt compatibilist accounts for their own purposes.
However, it is not clear that Clarkes assumption is correct. To know
if it is, we would need to know much more about desert. In fact, one
can imagine plausible conceptions of desert under which the
assumption would turn out to be false. For instance, one might
imagine that S deserves blame for his action only if the action made a
genuine diﬀerence to the world, where this notion of ‘‘diﬀerence-
making’’ is given a construal friendly to incompatibilism. Clarke
thinks that diﬀerence-making of this kind can be accounted for by
event-causal libertarianism, but not by compatibilism. Hence this
view of desert would undermine the claim that event-causal views do
no better than compatibilist views in accounting for moral respon-
sibility. Another way to put the point: there is a well-known literature
regarding the relevance, if any, to moral responsibility of the
availability of alternative possibilities.8 And it is quite possible that
those who take alternatives to be irrelevant to responsibility will win
that argument. If they do, then merely by securing alternative
possibilities, the event-causal libertarian gets no closer to accounting
for the basis of moral responsibility than does the compatibilist.
However, as Clarke emphasizes, we care about free will not just
because we care about the availability of alternatives. We also think
the actions of those with free will make a diﬀerence to the world, and
we think of free will as part of what it is for a person to enjoy the
special sort of dignity that only persons can. Why should we not
think that these other facets of free will are necessary for moral
desert? If they are, then event-causal libertarians, in so far as they are
able to explain them, can do better in explaining moral responsibility
than compatibilists can, contrary to Clarkes claim.
8 The literature is vast, but a recent anthology draws together many essays on the
topic: David Widerker and Michael McKenna (eds.), Moral Responsibility and
Alternative Possibilities (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2003).
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Be that as it may, if one accepts Clarkes claim that the freedom
necessary for desert is marked by a distinctive form of active control,
and if one accepts the premise that moral desert is incompatible with
determinism, then one is left looking for more than can be provided
by any event-causal account. At this point, Clarke turns to
consideration of the third kind of incompatibilist libertarianism:
agent-causalism. Agent-causal accounts appeal, somewhere in the
analysis of free action, to an irreducible causal relation between an
agent, construed as a substance, and some event.9 The relation is
‘‘irreducible’’ in the sense that it cannot be realized by any
combination of events standing in causal relations, or any other
relations, to one another. Typically, for instance, agent-causalists
insist that for an act to be free, a volition, decision, choice, or other
mental event must be caused by the agent.10
Clarke takes the most plausible form of agent-causal theory to be
what he calls ‘‘integrated agent-causalism.’’ The integrated agent-
causalist thinks that free actions are both indeterministically caused
by certain agent-involving events and caused by the agent. Clarke
describes the view in the following passage, which is worth quoting at
length:
Suppose that on some occasion a certain agent, Diana, is deliberating about
whether to pursue a certain course of action A1 or an alternative A2. She has rea-
sons favoring each and an intention to make up her mind now. Suppose that there
is a nonzero probability that R1 – Dianas having the reasons favoring A1 – (to-
gether with her having the indicated intention) will nondeterministically cause, in
an appropriate way, her making a decision D1 to pursue A1; and suppose that
there is, as well, a nonzero probability that R2 – Dianas having the reasons favor-
ing A2 – (together with her having the intention) will instead nondeterministically
cause, in an appropriate way, her making a decision D2 to pursue A2. Then, given
all prior conditions, it is genuinely open to Diana to make the former decision
and genuinely open to her to make the latter instead. Now suppose that, as a mat-
ter of nomological necessity, in the circumstances, whichever of the open decisions
the agent makes, that decision will be made, and it will be caused by the agents
having the reasons that favor it (together with her having the intention to make
up her mind) only if the agent causes that decision...Finally, suppose that, in fact,
9 Clarke thinks that there are no good reasons for thinking that only agents, and
not inert substances, can be causes. For discussion of two interesting arguments in
support of that contention oﬀered by Thomas Reid, see Gideon Yaﬀe, Manifest
Activity: Thomas Reid s Theory of Action (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004),
Chapters 1 and 2.
10 Clarke holds that agent-causal theorists can allow that non-mental events are
caused by agents and, in fact, he thinks that agent-causal theories are stronger when
they allow this. He is almost surely right about this.
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Diana makes decision D1. Her decision is caused by her, and it is non-determinis-
tically caused, in an appropriate way, by R1 and the present-directed intention to
make up her mind. On the proposed integrated agent-causal view, the agents exer-
cise of direct active control consists in her actions being caused, in this way, by
her and by these sorts of agent-involving events.11
A crucial part of the integrated agent-causal position here sketched is
the nomological necessity of the following proposition:
(*) The decision the agent makes will be caused by her having the reasons for
which she acts if and only if it is caused by her.12
The view is that an agents decision is free only if (*) is nomologically
necessary. Why is this claim an essential part of an integrated agent-
causal position? Why would it not be enough, for instance, for the
integrated agent-causalist to say that it is in fact the case that every
free action is caused both by the agents having certain reasons and
by the agent herself, even though it would be perfectly consistent with
the laws of nature for one or the other cause to be absent? Clarke is a
bit less explicit in his answer to this question than one might like. But
an answer can be, nonetheless, found in the book. Before rehearsing
it, ﬁrst notice that if (*) were not nomologically but instead
conceptually necessary, then the integrated agent-causal position
would collapse into an event-causal position in which agent-causation
is reduced to event causation, causation by the agents having of
certain reasons. After all, those wishing to reduce agent-causation to
event causation – those wishing, that is, to say what it is for an agent
to cause an event by appeal to certain special events that cause it –
would offer a biconditional of precisely the same form as (*), but
would insist that it is a conceptually necessary truth.
So, the integrated agent-causalist does not want to say that (*) is
conceptually necessary. But imagine what the theory would look like
if (*) were not even nomologically necessary, if it were merely a
contingent fact that agent-causation and causation by reasons
co-occur in free actions. If that were the view, then it would appear
11 Clarke, Libertarian Accounts of Free Will, p. 136.
12 In the passage, Clarke only mentions the forward direction of this bicondi-
tional. However, he commits himself to the backward direction, as well, given an
assumption: that the causes of an event that account for its being action include the
agents having of reasons (See Clarke, Libertarian Accounts of Free Will, pp. 145–
146). However, Clarke also allows the possibility that an agent could make a decision
for one set of reasons, and not for another set favoring the very same decision,
despite having both sets of reasons (See Clarke, Libertarian Accounts of Free Will,
p. 147). I have formulated (*) in such a way as to allow for this possibility.
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either that what the agents reasons cause is not a matter of what he
agent-causes, or that what the agent causes is not a matter of what he
has reasons to do. It would appear, that is, that from one point of
view the agent would be causally redundant, and from another his
reasons would be; and there would not, it seems, be any middle
ground for the integrated agent-causalist to occupy. In fact, Ginet has
objected to Clarkes integrated agent-causalism on something very
close to these lines.13 In reply, in the book, Clarke appeals to the fact
that (*) is nomologically necessary.14 Given the nomological necessity
of (*), it is true that were the agent not to agent-cause a particular
decision, she would not make that decision, for were she not to agent-
cause the decision her having of reasons favoring it would also not
cause that decision. And, conversely, were her reasons not to cause a
particular decision, then neither would she.
Roughly, the point is that the nomological necessity of (*) is what
integrates the agent-causal and the event-causal. If the agent and the
relevant events supplied two disconnected causal inﬂuences on action,
then the account would not be capturing the close connection
between what the agent herself adds to a free action and what is
added by her reasons. Clarkes integrated agent-causalist wants the
work of reasons and the work of the agent to be distinct, and yet to
walk in lock-step. The nomological necessity of (*) is intended to
supply that. And, it should be said, it is a virtue of integrated agent-
causalism that it makes a serious attempt at this form of integration.
Free action springs from the agents exercise of her rational powers.
The trick is to say in what sense this is true without either leaving
nothing for the agent to do that is not done by her reasons, or else
nothing for the reasons to do that is not done by the agent. The
nomological necessity of (*) is intended to help the integrated agent-
causalist to perform the trick.
Clarke thinks that an integrated agent-causal position can go a
great way towards providing an adequate account of free will. Under
such an account, fully free actions have all the virtues secured by a
compatibilist view: after all, they appeal to causation of action by all
the same mental states and events that compatibilists appeal to. They
also have all the virtues secured by an event-causal incompatibilist
view: after all, they involve satisfaction of all of the same conditions
13 Carl Ginet, ‘‘Reasons Explanations of Action: Causalist versus Noncausalist
Accounts,’’ in Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 386–405.
14 Clarke, Libertarian Accounts of Free Will, pp. 145–146.
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as an event-causal position, including the indeterministic causation
by various events. But they provide more, Clarke thinks, for
causation by the agent, he argues, provides a kind of active control
of free action that goes beyond anything supplied by event-causalism
and very well might be enough for genuine moral desert.
For all its virtues, however, Clarke thinks that any agent-causalist
account, including an integrated agent-causal account, faces a grave
difﬁculty: there are good reasons to think that agent-causation is
impossible. In support of this contention, Clarke works carefully
through a variety of arguments that have been offered for this
conclusion. Although he thinks some arguments for the impossibility
of agent-causation have been given greater credence than they
deserve, he holds that, on balance, the evidence does suggest that
agent-causation is, necessarily, nowhere to be found. It is a great
testament to Clarkes intellectual honesty that he has reached this
conclusion. In fact, the book is marked throughout by this virtue.
Clarke accepts the conclusions that he must accept; he allows truth to
be his guide. However, I want to suggest that one of the famous
arguments against the possibility of agent-causation presents a
greater difﬁculty to an integrated agent-causalism, in particular,
than Clarke suggests. The difﬁculty stems from the integrated
views requirement that (*) be nomologically but not conceptually
necessary.
Famously, C. D. Broad argued that, since events occur in time, at
least some part of an events total cause must occur in time. Since
agents are not dated, but, rather, persist through time, an agent
cannot be an events total cause.15 Standardly, agent-causalists have
claimed that the total cause of a free action is an agent; they have
denied that free actions are event-caused at all (This is true, for
instance, of Roderick Chisholms brand of agent-causalism16). Hence,
standardly, agent-causalists have fallen prey to this objection.
Although Clarke thinks that there may be a serious problem for
agent-causation deriving from the need for causes to be dated – he
thinks there is a problem here if every cause, and not just a total
cause, must be dated – he does not think that the objection, in the
form raised by Broad, creates a problem for an integrated agent-
15 C. D. Broad, Ethics and the History of Philosophy (New York: Humanities
Press, 1952), pp. 195–217.
16 Roderick Chisholm, ‘‘Freedom and Action,’’ in Keith Lehrer (ed.), Freedom
and Determinism (New York: Random House, 1966), pp. 11–44.
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causalism. After all, he argues, an integrated agent-causalist does not
think that the agent is the total cause of a free action; on such a view,
free actions are also caused by events, which are dated.
However, the problem is more serious for an integrated agent-
causalist than Clarke allows. To see this, start with the following
question: Under an integrated agent-causal position, are there
possible worlds in which the agent causes her action, but the action
is not caused by any events?17 In asking this question, we grant that
in such a possible world the agents action would not be free, but
since it is the possibility of agent-causation, and not the analysis of
free action provided by integrated agent-causalism that is at stake, to
grant this is to grant very little. If the integrated agent-causalist
answers the question in the negative, then he is denying that (*) is
merely nomologically necessary, but is instead asserting that it is
conceptually or logically necessary. So understood, integrated agent-
causalism collapses into an event-causal theory under which agent-
causation is reduced to causation by certain agent-involving events.
But if the integrated agent-causalist answers the question in the
aﬃrmative, as he must, then there is a possible world in which an
event is caused by an undated entity, an agent. This, as Broad pointed
out, is simply not possible. There is no possible world in which it is
so. In insisting that (*) is only nomologically necessary, the integrated
agent-causalist commits himself to the possibility, even if not the
actuality, of an agents being the total cause of an event, something
which does not seem possible. So, an integrated agent-causalist
account falls prey to Broads objection in its simplest form, the same
form in which it plagues all other agent-causal views. The point here
is, in a loose sense, Cartesian: if agent-causal inﬂuence is really
distinct from event-causal inﬂuence, then it must be possible for it to
exist independently; but it is just this possibility that Broads
objection challenges.
I started this review by noting that in the wake of the recognition
that acceptance of determinism is not required by a commitment to
17 Clarkes acceptance of an event-causal theory of action commits him to the
claim that an event that is not caused by any events is not an action, even if caused by
an agent. Given this point, one might think that the answer to the question here is,
necessarily and trivially, negative: there can be no possible worlds in which the action
is caused by no events. To avoid this and still give the question some bite, it should
be formulated thusly: Under an integrated agent-causal position, are there possible
worlds in which the agent causes the event E, which is, in the actual world, her
action, but E is not caused by any events?
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naturalism, incompatibilist libertarianism has enjoyed a resurgence.
Of course, a commitment to naturalism means more than just a
commitment to constrain ones philosophical analyses by the facts as
testiﬁed by the sciences. It also involves a commitment to appealing,
in ones analyses, only to entities and relations that are naturally
possible, that could be part of the universes fabric without the help of
something supernatural and mysterious, whether or not the sciences
testify to their existence. Clarkes book marks a leap forward in our
understanding of all the various forms of incompatibilism, particu-
larly in its arguments for the claim that incompatibilists can build on,
rather than reject, the insights contained in compatibilist theories of
free action and causal theories of action. But the moral one might
take from the book, which is somewhat different (although in the
neighborhood) of the moral that Clarke takes, is that the prospects
for a truly satisfactory incompatibilist account of free action rest on
the shoulders of the event-causal libertarians, for agent-causation, in
the end, is not the sort of thing that we can hope to ﬁnd in this world,
a world where nothing supernatural exists and all the events that
happen, happen in time.
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